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Abstract 
Does it matter whether you work for a successful company? And if so, does it matter who you are? To 
answer these questions we construct a unique panel dataset covering the pay of all CEOs, senior 
managers and a fully representative sample of workers for a large group of publicly-listed companies 
covering just under 90% of the market capitalization of the UK stock market. We show that senior 
management appear to have pay that is strongly associated with various measures of firm performance 
(such as shareholder returns and quasi-rents), while workers’ pay is only weakly associated with such 
measures. A 10% increase in firm value is associated with an increase of 3% in CEO pay but only 
0.2% in average workers’ pay. Falls in firm performance are also followed by CEO pay cuts and 
significantly more CEO firings. This is essentially a result of the responsiveness of flexible pay to 
performance and only senior executives have a large enough share of pay in bonuses to generate a 
sizeable  overall  effect  on  pay.  External  control  matters  for  pay  -  firms  with  lower  levels  of 
institutional ownership have smaller pay-performance elasticities for CEOs and do not cut their pay 
when performance is poor. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In  the  wake  of  the  financial  crisis  the  pay  of  CEOs  is  high  on  the  agenda  of 
policymakers all over the world. Two linked factors seem to be responsible for this. 
First, the pay of CEOs and other senior executives has risen much faster than that of 
ordinary workers. Second, there is growing concern that this pay is unrelated to the 
actual contribution of the CEO to the business they run. Corporate scandals from 
Enron  to  Worldcom  to  Merrill  Lynch  seem  to  suggest  that  executives  are  more 
concerned  with  extracting  value  from  the  business  than  improving  the  long-run 
performance of the firm. At the same time worker’s wages are hardly rising in real 
terms and they seem to benefit from none of the “performance” used to justify CEO 
pay. 
 
That CEO pay has risen substantially relative to workers over the last few decades is 
beyond  dispute.  An  oft-quoted  number  is  the  ratio  of  CEO  pay  to  the  pay  of  an 
ordinary worker. Indeed this ratio acquired legislative recognition in the Dodd-Frank 
Act. The size of this ratio has unambiguously been rising in both the UK and US.  For 
the US, Bertrand (2009) shows that the median corporate executive officer earned 110 
times the average workers earnings in 2005, compared with less than 30 times in the 
early 1970s. More dramatic still, Conyon et al (2010) find that for S&P500 CEOs, the 
average CEO made 31 times the wage of the average production worker in 1970 (26 
times for the median CEO) but this ratio was 325 by 2008 (240 times for the median). 
Less consistent figures exist for the UK. However, Conyon, Gregg and Machin (1995) 
show that the median pay of the highest paid directors in FTSE-100 companies was 
£63,000 in 1980
1, compared to median wages of £5,400. By 2010, the median pay of 
this set of directors was £2.99m, while median wages had risen to £25,900. Thus the 
ratio went from 11 to 116
2. This rise in CEO pay has been mirrored in a substantial 
rise in the share of income going to the very top earners  – only a small minority of 
whom  are  CEOs  (see  Atkinson,  Piketty  and  Saez  (2011)  and  Kaplan  and  Rauh 
(2010)). 
                                                 
1 This covers only salary and bonus. However in 1980 very few UK firms had equity-linked 
remuneration. 
2 Of course this ratio is focused on CEOs of FTSE 100 companies rather than the broader cross-section 
of listed firms. Such CEOs tend to earn substantially more than the average.  For the sample that we 
use in this paper (the largest 300 firms each year), the median pay of CEOs in 2010 was £1.32m, 
producing a median pay ratio of 51 (and a mean pay ratio of 60). 3 
 
 
But is it true that pay does not respond to firm performance – and exactly who’s pay 
responds? There is in fact pervasive evidence across many countries that the pay of 
CEOs is correlated with measures of corporate performance (e.g. Bertrand, 2009).
3  
This is most commonly measured using   shareholder returns (the  so-called  “pay-
performance  elasticity”)  but  is  also  observed  using  accounting  measures  of 
performance  such  as  profitability  and  sales  growth.  But  what  about  more  junior 
managers  and  ordinary  workers?  Do  they  reap  some  of  the  rewards  of  improved 
corporate  performance?  Surprisingly  little  is  known  about  the  responsiveness  of 
wages outside the Boardroom to shareholder returns. Bronars and Famulari (2001) 
provide some evidence that white-collar workers have pay-performance elasticities of 
perhaps two-thirds the size of CEOs, but this is from a reasonably small sample and is 
cross-sectional.  
 
There is a more extensive empirical literature on the importance of “rent-sharing” for 
average worker wages. In general, the evidence seems to suggest that workers are paid 
more in firms that are more profitable. However the majority of this evidence relates 
to  manufacturing  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  and  is  rarely  able  to  control  for  match 
quality  between  workers  and  firms.  There  remains  a  concern  that  much  of  the 




In this paper we explore the responsiveness of wages across the corporate hierarchy to 
firm performance. We are able to link the pay of CEOs, senior executives and a  large 
sample of workers for  over 400 large publicly-listed companies in the UK over the 
period 2001-2010. This sample of companies accounts for  just under  90% of the 
market capitalization of all UK-domiciled companies. For a sub-sample of firms we 
have access to a confidential annual remuneration survey conducted by a leading 
executive compensation consultancy that provides very detailed data on pay for the 
top layers of management within the firm. Thus we are able to identify a large group 
                                                 
3 This does not rule out the possibility that CEOs are also, and perhaps substantially, rewarded for luck 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). Nor does it imply that the pay-performance elasticity is optimal. 
4 For example, in Nickell, Vainiomaki and Wadhwani (1994) the coefficient on firm performance in a 
panel wage regression using just the average wage in the firm drops by two-thirds when the panel is re-
run using the average wage of a group of workers of the same skill level. 4 
 
of executives whose pay is not reported in annual remuneration reports but who are 
very senior within the company.  
 
To motivate our work we first replicate the classic rent-sharing study of Blanchflower, 
Oswald and Sanfey (1996). They used an unbalanced panel from US manufacturing 
over the period 1964-85 to show that a rise in a sector’s profitability was followed by 
an increase in the level of wages. They control for worker characteristics such as 
education and experience by matching the CPS at the industry level and including 
industry fixed effects. The estimated long-run elasticity between pay and performance 
is 0.068
5. Following the same procedures as Blanchflower et al (1996) we put together 
data between 1964-2005 that allows us to split the sample period into 1964 -85 (their 
estimation period) and 1986-2005
6.  
 
In Table A1 we report estimates for annual log earnings regressions. Column 1 reports 
the estimates from Table IV of Blanchflower et al (1996), Column 2 reports the same 
specification over the first half of the sample and column 3 estimates the same model 
over the latter half of the sample. Although our replication in column 2 finds broadly 
similar and significant rent -sharing effects as Blanchflower e t al (1996) over the 
1964-1985 period, there are no such effects over the later period 1986 -2005. This 
suggests,  for  the  average  worker  the  “rent  sharing”  parameter  has  essentially 
disappeared.  We also  estimated the model using data on hourly log earnings for 
production workers from the NBER Productivity Database.
7 The long-run elasticity 
for the first half of the sample (0.054) is remarkably close to the estimate in column 1, 
but again, any rent -sharing seems to have vanished since then ,  with a long-run 
elasticity of precisely zero. 
 
These findings suggest that rent-sharing may be a thing of the past. When unions were 
stronger or markets in manufacturing less competitive, workers may have been able to 
                                                 
5 This is calculated from  the estimated semi-elasticity and the mean  of profits per head. 
6 Data on wages, hours and worker characteristics come from the CPS March Annual Demographic file 
and profits per worker come from the NBER productivity database. 
7 This has the advantage of allowing us to identify 459 consistent 4-digit industries rather than the 16 2-
digit industries. The disadvantage is that we cannot control for worker characteristics that change over 
time across industries. The last three columns of Table A1 report the results for this alternative and 
show similar results to the first three columns (although the wider industrial cross-section improves the 
precision). Unemployment is these regressions is measured at the 2-digit industry level. 5 
 
share in the rents from firms. But maybe this is no longer true today? In fact, we will 
show that rent sharing appears alive and well – at least for employees high enough up 
the corporate hierarchy. We find that the pay of CEOs and senior executives within 
the  firm  are  strongly  correlated  with  corporate  performance  measures  –  both 
shareholder returns and quasi-rents. Lower-level managers (essentially white-collar 
non-executives) have a positive pay-performance elasticity but only around one-fifth 
of the magnitude for senior executives. In contrast, ordinary workers have pay that 
appears relatively unresponsive to firm performance.  
 
We  then  show  that  these  results  are  easily  understood  by  examining  the 
responsiveness of individual pay components to performance. For all levels of worker, 
salary is not strongly related to performance while bonuses, and to a lesser extent 
other  forms  of  incentive  pay,  are  very  strongly  related.  This  is  true  for  ordinary 
workers as well as CEOs, though the elasticity is larger in the latter case. But since 
bonuses account for a small share of total pay for lower-level workers, the overall 
effect is negligible. For CEOs and senior executives, bonuses are a large share of pay, 
so the overall pay-performance elasticity is large and significant. Finally, we show 
that the link between pay and performance is stronger and more symmetric in those 
firms that have higher levels of institutional ownership – external control matters for 
pay determination, at least at the top. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we briefly discuss the related 
theoretical and empirical literature on the links between firm performance and wages. 
In Section III we provide details of the various datasets used in the paper and present 
some  summary  statistics  on  pay  across  the  corporate  hierarchy.  Our  results  are 
presented in Section IV and we conclude in Section V. 
 
 
II.  THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND EXISTING EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
The  standard  competitive  model  predicts  that  long-run  wages  should  depend  on 
worker’s skills, both observed and unobserved, but not on the performance of the 6 
 
firm
8. However in more realistic setti ngs, we might expect to observe a positive 
correlation between wages and firm performance  – e.g. standard bargaining models 
predict such a link. Another example is the recent work on firm heterogeneity, trade 
and wages, in which more productive firms screen more intensively, hire more able 
workers  and  pay  higher  wages.  The  differences  in  firm  characteristics  are 
systematically  related  to  export  performance,  as  exporters  are  larger  and  more 
productive (e.g. Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding, 2010). 
 
To be more concrete, consider two models of wage determination that generate links 
between firm performance and wages. First, suppose we have a model in which wages 
are  determined  by  a  Nash  problem,  with  θ  measuring  the  bargaining  power  of 
employees. This has traditionally been associated with union-bargaining. Note that θ 
can vary across employees so that some employees e.g. senior managers may have 
more bargaining power. The maximisation problem is simply: 
 
       {[ ( )    (  ̅)] }   (     )     
 
where u(w) is the worker’s utility from wage w,   ̅ is the outside wage in the event of 
a  breakdown  in  bargaining,  n  is  employment  and  π  is  profits.  Profits  are  zero  if 
bargaining breaks down. It is easily shown that at an interior optimum, the first-order 
conditions imply that: 
       ̅   (
 






The  equilibrium  wage  is  determined  by  the  outside  wage,  the  relative  bargaining 
strength of the two sides and the level of profits-per-worker. 
 
As an alternative, the standard agency model has risk-neutral shareholders trying to 
induce risk-averse employees (typically senior executives) to maximise shareholder 
value. With imperfect observability, shareholders cannot contract on actions. Thus 
they  offer  a contract  that  makes  pay dependent on the  firm’s performance.  Let  p 
denote firm performance and a the employee’s actions. Firm performance depends on 
                                                 
8 Firm characteristics should only matter if they affect compensating differentials for workers (e.g. 
Rosen, 1986). 7 
 
the  actions  of  the  employee  and  on  random  factors,  u.  Holmstrom  and  Milgrom 
(1987) derive the optimal incentive scheme, w, for this model. Since shareholders can 
only observe p, this is all the incentive scheme can depend on. So,  
 
 
w = α + βp  
 
If we assume that the worker has exponential utility,  ( )      [ (  ( )], where r 
is absolute risk aversion and c(e) is the convex disutility of effort, the optimal sharing 
rate is simply (see Murphy (1999)): 
   
 
          
 
 
From our perspective, the important implications of this sharing rule are that  β is 
declining for more risk-averse workers (      ⁄    ) and where there is more noise in 
the relationship between worker effort and firm performance(          ) ⁄ . Both of 
these effects seem likely to be more important for more junior employees. Thus we 
expect β to be larger for CEOs than more junior workers. 
 
There is an extensive empirical literature showing that firm characteristics matter for 
wages. For example, Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) show that while worker-
“quality”  is  most  important  in  explaining  overall  individual  wage  variation,  firm-
specific effects are also significant and the two are not highly correlated. What are 
these firm-specific effects? There is evidence that part of the effect is related to the 
profitability of the firm. Firms that have more profits appear to pay higher wages than 
otherwise identical firms. Manning (2011) reviews this literature. There are two key 
difficulties with this body of evidence. First, most studies use data on the average 
wage in a firm, so the panel is at the firm-level rather than the individual-level. This 
then raises the concern that more profitable firms hire more-able workers and that the 
positive correlation is capturing this effect. Firm fixed-effects mitigate this problem 
but do not solve it since the average unobserved worker quality may vary over time 
within a firm. Second, profits are potentially endogenous. Suppose, for example, that 
efficiency wages are important so that firms who pay workers more experience a rise 8 
 
in profits. It has generally proved difficult to identify a strong instrument that also 
satisfies the exclusion restrictions.  
 
In a recent contribution to this literature, Card, Devicienti and Maida (2010) examine 
the prevalence of rent-sharing in a large panel of individual workers employed in a 
region of Italy. Pooled OLS estimates that control for worker and firm characteristics 
but not worker-firm match quality generate wage-rent elasticities of the order of 0.07. 
Controlling  for  the  worker-firm  match  reduces  this  estimate  to  0.008.  Finally, 
instrumenting the rents measure using rents in the same 4-digit industry in other parts 
of  Italy  generates  an  elasticity  of  0.029.  These  results  point  to  three  important 
conclusions.  First,  worker-firm  matches  matter  enormously  and  ignoring  them 
potentially  generates  a  large  upward  bias  in  the  rent-sharing  estimate.  Second, 
instrumenting rents also seems to matter and ignoring this generates a downward bias 
in the rent-sharing estimate.
9 Third, the magnitude of the pay -performance link for 
ordinary workers does not seem to be that large  – since moving from the least to the 
most profitable firm generates no more than a 10% increase in wages.  
 
Since the seminal work of Jensen and Murphy (1990), there have been hundreds of 
estimates of the link between CEO pay and firm performance. The key performance 
metric used tends to be shareholder returns since this is the obvious objective in a 
principal-agent model with shareholders as the principals. The extensive literature has 
recently been reviewed by Frydman and Jenter (2010). The overall conclusion is that 
there  is  a  positive,  statistically  significant  relationship  between  CEO  pay  and 
shareholder returns. This link exists for most time periods and across most countries, 
and there appears to have been an increase in the sensitivity of pay to performance in 
more recent times’ as CEO compensation has tilted toward a more incentive-based 
structure (see Hall and Liebman (1998)). However, the interpretation of a positive 
pay-performance link for CEOs remains a more open question. It may be the outcome 
of an optimal contract between principal and agent or it could reflect the exercise of 
managerial power in an executive rent-sharing setting.  
 
                                                 
9 It should also be noted that Card et al find that the wage-rents elasticity is much larger in 
manufacturing firms than in non-manufacturing. Indeed even after instrumenting, the coefficient is not 
significantly different from zero for non-manufacturing. This is important since most of the prior 
empirical literature focused exclusively on manufacturing firms.  9 
 
There is very little work examining the link between shareholder returns and the pay 
of either executives below the Boardroom or ordinary workers. This is principally a 
result of the lack of data on individual wages in publicly-listed companies. While the 
pay of the five most senior executives is recorded annually in the remuneration report, 
no other wage data is revealed (other than the total firm wage bill). Standard US wage 
data sources such as the Current Population Survey do not easily link to firm-level 
identifiers  that  would  allow  for  the  wage-shareholder  return  relationship  to  be 
estimated.  Bronars  and  Famulari  (2001)  provide  some  evidence  from  a  specially 
conducted survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This survey collected data on the 
pay of white-collar workers that was then linked to firm identifiers. This produced a 
small sample of 807 workers who worked for 92 different publicly listed companies. 
They  find  that  equity  returns  in  the  firm  three  to  six  years  prior  are  positively 
correlated with individual wages, controlling for individual characteristics. The size of 
the  effect  for  white-collar  workers  is  roughly  one-third  smaller  than  that  of  the 
matched  CEO  pay-performance  elasticity.  Unfortunately,  the  analysis  is  cross 
sectional so the result could be due to unobserved worker or firm fixed effects.
10  
 
III.  DATA 
IIIA. Remuneration Data 
Our main data on pay comes from three sources: Boardex, Towers Watson (TW) and 
ASHE  (Annual  Survey  of  Hours  and  Earnings).  The  Boardex  database  provides 
annual data from the Remuneration report of all listed-UK companies. This database 
is  essentially  the  UK  version  of  US  ExecuComp.  The  data  cover  up  to  the  five 
highest-paid executives within the firm and report base salary, cash bonuses, stock 
options (valued via the Black-Scholes formula) and the face value of all Long-Term 
Incentive Plan (LTIP) awards. These awards can take the form of options, restricted 
and performance-related shares, matching plans, deferred cash etc. We measure total 
expected compensation as the sum of all these components. We separately identify the 
CEO and the remaining subordinate executives. Our sample is the 300 largest and 
publicly  listed  UK-domiciled  firms  each  year  from  2000-2010,  representing  on 
average 94% of the market capitalization of the UK stock market. This gives a total 
                                                 
10 For a small sub-sample, the authors have data on the starting wage of the worker’s, which allows 
them to condition on this to attempt to control for worker-firm match quality. This is unlikely to be 
satisfactory in any model in which firms and workers learn about the match-quality over time. Their 
results are the same as in the cross-section. 10 
 
sample of 498 firms. We then match these 498 firms to the Boardex database and 
obtain  439  matches  with  pay  data,  representing  around  85%  of  total  market 
capitalization.
11 We have a final Boardex sample of 900 CEOs and 2,342  non-CEO 
executives. 
 
Second, we have access to a proprietary remuneration survey conducted annually by 
Towers Watson, one of the world’s leading human resources consultants. TW survey 
a sample of large UK companies. The survey covers between 100-150 firms each year 
over the period 2001-2010. There are two key advantages of the TW data over the 
published Boardex data. First, the TW survey provides us with extensive data on the 
pay of senior executives below the Board level. Reporting lines within the firm are 
used to generate management levels depending on the distance between the executive 
and the CEO. So “Level 1” are CEOs, “Level 2” are executives reporting directly to 
the CEO, and so on. Firms choose how many levels down to report and the percentage 
of executives within a level to report. Discussions with TW confirm that coverage of 
Levels 1 and 2 within a firm is almost complete and Level 3 is also well represented. 
We combine all executives at Level 3 and below into one level since their average 
annual remuneration are broadly similar.  For the sample used for which we have at 
least two years of data, we have 163 CEOs, 918 Level 2 executives, and 2,193 Level 3 
and below executives. 
 
The second advantage of the TW data is that the valuation of all the components of 
pay is performed consistently by analysts at TW. Crucially, firms provide information 
on the exact structure of the LTIP share awards (e.g. comparator measure, comparator 
group, vesting triggers and percentages etc.) which allows for the construction of an 
ex ante valuation of these important components of pay. To our knowledge this is the 
first paper that has been able to use expected values for these types of awards. On 
average, the TW sample places a 40% ex-ante valuation on the face value of such 
LTIP awards (which is what we use in the Boardex sample where we do not know the 
details of LTIPs). 
 
                                                 
11 We fully match every firm to a Boardex identifier. The 59 firms without pay data are generally those 
that delisted at some point in 2001 or 2002 and appear not to have had their remuneration reports 
entered or archived by Boardex – see Data Appendix for more details.    11 
 
Finally, our sample of workers’ wages comes from ASHE. This is a sample of 1% of 
all employees in the UK based on the final two-digits of an individual’s national 
insurance number (the same as a US Social Security number). As a consequence of 
this sampling frame, the data provide a panel of workers over time. The survey is 
conducted in the first week of April in each year and data is provided by employers. 
Compliance is a legal requirement and the data is very accurate. The data we use run 
from 2002-2009 and cover annual pay, including all cash-based forms of incentive 
and bonus pay. Importantly, from 2002 ASHE started to distinguish between base 
salary and bonuses, so we can decompose the effects of firm performance on these 
two types of remuneration (see also Bell and Van Reenen, 2010). There is no data on 
share-based incentive plans but this is unlikely to be a serious omission as ordinary 
UK workers have virtually none of their pay in shares. 
 
III.B Company Data 
Our various sources on wages are all matched together using firm-level identifiers 
(further explanation of the matching process is contained in the Data Appendix). Our 
final core sample contains 439 companies that have data from Boardex on the pay of 
CEOs and Level 2 executives. Of these 439 companies, we are able to match to 376 in 
ASHE and therefore have data on the pay of other workers in the same firm. This 
gives us a sample of 5,108 managers and 23,738 workers who are below the executive 
level. Finally, we have a subset of 126 firms for which we also have data from TW on 
the pay of a broader range of executives.  
 
For all these firms we also have annual company account data and stock price data 
merged in from Thompson Datastream. These relate to the worldwide consolidated 
activity of the firm and enable us to construct standard measures of firm performance 
such as shareholders’ return, quasi-rents, profitability and revenues per worker. It is 
also  possible  to  extract  information  from  the  confidential  ARD,  which  are  the 
confidential but mandatory reports to the UK equivalent of the Census Bureau (the 
ONS). We use this to construct other measures of performance based on the domestic 





IIIC Data Description 
Table 1 reports some summary statistics for the wage data. We report the mean level 
of total pay for each type of worker and break this total into the component parts. The 
Towers Watson data shows that the average total package for CEOs over the sample 
period was £2.05m. Over the course of the decade, the average package rose from 
£1.38m in 2001 to £2.61m in 2009/10. Base salary accounts for 34% of remuneration, 
cash bonuses for another 31% and long-term incentive plans for the remaining 35%. 
As we move down the corporate hierarchy, the ratio of total pay from one level to the 
next drops significantly. So CEOs (Level 1) earn 207% more than the next rung on 
the ladder (Level 2), and they in turn earn 151% more than the next rung (Level 3).
12 
In addition, the structure of pay changes as we move down the hierarchy. LTIPs 
account for 35% of CEO pay, but only 19 % of those in Level 3 + jobs. In contrast, 
cash bonuses account for around 30% of total pay for all levels of management. 
 
The Boardex data show broadly the same pattern  as TW. The level of CEO pay is 
lower than in the TW sample (sinc e the Boardex  sample  includes more mid-cap 
firms), with total expected pay of £1.26m. However the composition of pay is very 
close to that in the TW sample, with base salary accounting for 35% of remuneration, 
cash bonuses for another 25% and long-term incentive plans for the remaining 40%. 
Level 2 executives have higher pay than might be expected (since CEOs earn 79 % 
more rather than the 209% observed in the TW data), but it should be recalled that the 
Level 2 executives reported in Boardex are up to the next four-highest paid executives 
rather than the full cross-section of executives reporting to the CEO. Again however 
the similarity with the TW sample in terms of level and composition is clear. 
 
The data from ASHE show the  large gaps that exist between p ay at the top of a 
company  and  that  of  the average  worker. For  those workers not  in managerial 
positions average annual pay is around £21,000, of which of only 5% is bonus pay
13. 
This compares with  average cash remuneration of  £707,000 for the matched CEOs, 
                                                 
12 These figures can be compared to those reported in Main et al (1993) who have similar data on US 
executives over the period 1980-4. They estimate a ratio of 141% for CEOs and 75% for the next rung. 
It should be noted that they only have cash remuneration data. If we recalculate using this measure, our 
equivalent ratios are 139% and 115%. 
13 The worker sample is restricted to those in the same job as 12 months ago earning at least £4,000 per 
year. 13 
 
giving a pay ratio of 34. If instead we compare with total expected remuneration, this 
ratio rises to 57.  
 
IV.  MAIN RESULTS 
 
In this section we report estimates of pay-performance elasticities across the corporate 
hierarchy, using both shareholder returns and quasi-rents as measures of performance. 
We also reconcile our results with the previous literature on both CEO and worker 
pay. Finally, we examine which components of pay are key to understanding the pay-
performance links we observe. 
 
IVA. Firm-Level Pay-Performance Regressions 
We estimate standard panel regressions of the form: 
 
  (   )            ∑        
 
                                                 (1) 
 
where     (   )    is the total remuneration of employee i at firm j at time t,     is an 
individual worker-firm match fixed effect,    are time dummies and   is the measure 
of firm performance – either shareholder returns or proxies for quasi-rents. We allow 
both for the contemporaneous effect of performance on pay and lagged effects (our 
baseline  is  K=2,  but  we  also  experimented  with  alternative  dynamic  forms).  The 
model is estimated as a fixed-effect panel, with robust standards errors clustered at the 
firm level. 
 
Table 2 contains estimates using total shareholder returns (TSR) as the measure of 
performance. These results are therefore identical to the standard pay-performance 
regressions in the CEO literature but now applied across the corporate hierarchy. We 
use our three different datasets and various corporate reporting levels.  
 
The  pay-performance  elasticity  for  the  CEOs  in  the  Towers  Watson  sample  is 
estimated at 0.248 in the short-run and 0.295 in the long-run, which is certainly on the 14 
 
high side of estimates for the UK.
14 The elasticity declines as we move down the 
corporate  hierarchy  with  those  in  the  next  reporting  level  (Level  2)  having  an 
elasticity of 0.173, about two-thirds as big as  CEOs, with a similar reduction  as we 
move to the next level (0.121). However the effect is significant for all the executives 
in this sample. If we allow for a dynamic effect, the results are broadly similar, though 
the CEO elasticity now rises to 0.295 and those of the lower levels falls slightly. 
 
Turning to the broader Boardex sample, we estimate TSR elasticities of around 0.2 for 
both CEOs and those in Level 2.  Thus the broader group of senior executives shows 
very similar elasticities. These fall somewhat when we allow for lagged shareholder 
returns effects, but the overall elasticities remain sizeable and significant. 
 
So we know that pay appears closely linked to TSR performance for most executives, 
with those at the top of the hierarchy having the most responsive  pay. What about 
lower-level workers? Focusing on the ASHE sample in the lower panel of Table 2, we 
can  see  that  there  is  a  significant  estimated  elasticity  of  pay  with  respect  to 
shareholder returns for non-managerial workers, but the magnitude of the coefficient 
is tiny: an order of magnitude smaller than that  observed for senior executives. For 
managers there is a somewhat larger positive effect on pay – though still around five 
times smaller than that for CEOs.  
 
Table  3  uses  quasi-rents,  the  difference  between  sales  per  head  and  the  average 
outside wage, as an alternative measure of firm performance. We assume here that the 
outside wage for all executives is captured by the aggregate time dummies (i.e. a 
common pool for talent), while for managers we control for the two-digit industry 
average wage and for workers both the two-digit industry and two-digit occupation 
average wage. We have also experimented with (i) adjusting sales for industry-level 
intermediate cost shares and (ii) using more disaggregated industries, but this has little 
effect on our estimates. This model is similar to that estimated by Card et al (2010), 
though they specify the rents variable in levels rather than logs and include capital per 
head. 
                                                 
14 Conyon et al (2011) have an estimate of 0.096 over the period 2003-08 and Ozkan (2009) reports an 
estimate of 0.093 over the period 1999-2005. However the sample in both papers covers much smaller 
companies on average than the TW sample. Indeed the summary statistics on pay levels in Ozkan are 
much closer to the Level 2 executives in the TW data. 15 
 
 
Once again, we find a strong positive correlation between executive pay and firm 
performance.  For  both  CEOs  and  the  immediate  level  below,  the  elasticity  is 
estimated to be around 0.2. The effect is roughly half the size for the lower level of 
executives. As with the TSR results, we find elasticities approximately one-tenth the 
size for workers and about one-fifth the size for managers.  
 
Are the small pay-performance elasticity we observe for workers merely a result of 
focusing on a select group of large, quoted companies? To assess this, we estimate 
quasi-rent  sharing  models  across  all  workers.  The  Annual  Respondent  Database 
(ARD) provides annual sales and employment data for every UK company, whether 
quoted  or  private.  This  data  can  be  linked  to  ASHE  for  the  period  2002-2008. 
Compared to our Boardex/ASHE sample, this increases the number of observations 
by a factor of five.  It should be noted that the measurement of quasi-rents is not 
identical to that in Table 3. The ARD only measures sales and employment in the UK, 
while the sales and employment data used in Table 3 comes from the firm’s annual 
accounts and therefore covers the firms’ global totals. We might expect this difference 
to matter more for our quoted companies since they generally have extensive overseas 
operations.  
 
The results of this exercise are shown in the first column of Appendix Table A2. For 
the  full  sample  of  workers,  we  estimate  an  elasticity  of  0.007,  which  is  actually 
smaller than that reported in Table 3. Interestingly this elasticity is almost identical to 
the OLS estimate for Italian workers using a very similar estimating model reported 
by Card et al (2010) who obtain an elasticity of 0.008 for value-added per worker. If 
we examine the rent-sharing elasticity for various sub-groups it is clear that the effect 
is much larger for very small companies and somewhat larger for manufacturing than 
non-manufacturing. This second result is also found by Card et al. Thus the small 
elasticity  we  find  with  respect  to  quasi-rents  for  workers  appears  a  general 
phenomenon for all those working for medium and large-size companies, rather than a 
result of our particular sampling frame. 
 
The final panel of Table A2 compares the results for our Boardex/ASHE sample of 
companies  that  have  both  global  accounts  measures  of  quasi-rents  and  UK-only 16 
 
measures  from  the  ARD.  The  results  show  that  there  is  no  substantial  difference 
between the two measures in terms of the estimated rent-sharing parameter
15. 
 
Equation (1) assumes that pay is symmetric with respect to performance. This may 
not  be  a  realistic  assumption.  For  example,  Bertrand  and  Mullainathan  (2001) 
highlight the fact that large falls i n the oil price do not seem to correlate well with 
declines in the pay of oil company CEOs, while oil price rises do seem to be 
associated  with  pay  gains.  So  perhaps  CEOs  are  rewarded  for  good  outcomes 
(whether or not the outcome is due to their input) but not punished for bad outcomes. 
To explore this question in detail, we estimate (1) in first -differences and allow for a 
differential impact on pay growth from positive and negative shareholder returns. 
Table 4 reports the results of this exercise. The first column shows the pay elasticity 
for all returns, while the second column reports the additional pay elasticity associated 
with positive returns only.  If CEOs were rewarded for  good outcomes and not 
punished  for  bad  outcomes, the first  coefficient  would  be  zero and  the second 
positive.  If  instead,  pay  was  symmetric  with  respect  to  performance,  the  first 
coefficient would be positive and the second zero.  For both the TW and ASHE data, 
we cannot reject this second hypothesis. In contrast, the Boardex data d oes provide 
support for the idea that senior executives gain more from good outcomes than they 
lose from bad outcomes.  But even then, we find no evidence to support the idea that 
CEOs are only exposed to the upside. 
 
IV.B  Firm Performance and Components of Pay 
In Tables 5 and 6 we break total remuneration into three components: base salary, 
cash  bonus  and  long-term  incentive  plans  (LTIP).  We  then  re-run  equation  (1) 
separately for each component of pay. Note that because both bonuses and incentive 
pay are zero for some workers we add £1 to the dependent variable to allow us to take 
logs (recall also that we only observe the first two components of pay in the ASHE 
data). 
 
                                                 
15 It should be noted that the rent-sharing parameter is estimated to be 0.009 compared to 0.019 in 
Table 3. The key reason for this is that Table 3 includes data for 2009 while we only have ARD data up 
to 2008. If we re-estimate the model in Table 3 without 2009 data, the coefficient drops to 0.012. The 
remainder of the difference is caused by firms that do not have recorded sales or employment data in 
the ARD. 17 
 
The  results  in  Table  5  show  that  the  pay-performance  link  is  driven  by  the 
responsiveness of incentive pay to current shareholder returns. In the TW sample, 
there is a small positive effect on base salaries for CEOs, but the coefficient implies 
that a 10% increase in shareholder returns generates only a 0.3% increase in base 
salary. In contrast, the same increase in returns generates a 38% increase in the cash 
bonus. The responsiveness of bonuses to performance declines monotonically across 
the  corporate  hierarchy.  The  effect  on  LTIPs  is  substantially  smaller.  This  is 
consistent with the view that firms set target incentive awards primarily as a multiple 
of base salary and do not explicitly allow current performance to influence the level of 
such  awards.  In  contrast,  cash  bonuses  are  often  explicitly  justified  in  terms  of 
contemporaneous performance. The results for the Boardex sample of executives are 
the same. Interestingly when we break the annual pay of managers and workers into 
base  salary  and  cash  bonus  the  same  pattern  we  observed  in  the  executives  data 
occurs. Salary across both types of worker is unrelated to TSR, while bonuses are 
positively related for all workers. So workers bonuses rise by 7.5% for every 10% 
improvement in shareholder returns, and managers bonuses rise by 14%. 
 
The results for quasi-rents given in Table 6 are broadly similar, though the results for 
the TW sample are all measured with considerable imprecision. But as with the TSR 
results, we find that rent-sharing occurs primarily through its effects on the incentive 
elements of pay. Indeed in both the Boardex and ASHE samples it is striking how 
strong the links are between quasi-rents and bonuses. 
 
Why do we find no effect on workers’ total pay from firm performance if we observe 
strong  effects  on  bonuses?  The  simple  answer  is  that  workers  do  not  receive  a 
substantial fraction of their pay in bonuses. For the average worker, only 5% of pay is 
accounted for by bonuses. So a 10% rise in shareholder returns translates into only 
about a 0.4% rise in total pay. Appendix Tables A3 and A4 present similar regressions 
where  the  dependent  variable  is  the  proportion  of  total  remuneration  in  bonus  or 
incentive pay showing qualitatively similar results: increases in firm performance are 





IV.C. Firm Performance and Job Exit 
Our estimates implicitly assume that the executive or worker remains with the firm 
and so is in a position to have their pay respond to changes in firm performance. It is 
plausible however that poor performance may lead not only to lower wages but also to 
an increased probability of a job separation (e.g. Huson et al, 2001). Thus we may be 
underestimating the impact of firm performance. To examine this issue, we estimate 
job-exit probabilities for executives and workers. Since the TW sample varies from 
year to year it is difficult to identify the exact year of departure for any executive
16. 
As a result we only present results for the Boardex data which covers all years and the 
ASHE data for workers. We define a job -exit as occurring subsequent to the last 
observed pay year for an individual with a particular firm, provided we observe the 
same firm in the following year but without the individual employed. 
 
Table 7 reports the marginal probabilities of job-exit for CEO’s, Level 2 executives 
and all other workers.  The key independent  variable is  the change in  shareholder 
returns.  In  addition,  we  include  time  dummies  to  control  for  macroeconomic 
conditions  affecting  job-separation  rates.  For  senior  executives  we  find  strong 
negative effects from shareholder returns. In other words, poor firm performance is 
associated with an increased risk of job-exit. For workers, the effect is much small 
and no longer significant. 
 
We also experimented with allowing for an asymmetry in the job-exit probability with 
respect to shareholder returns. However we found no significant difference between 
the impact of positive or negative returns on job-exits. This may be a result of the fact 
that  our  data  cannot  distinguish  between  voluntary  and  involuntary  job-exits. 
Gregory-Smith et al (2009) show that for a broadly similar group of UK CEOs over 
the period 1996-2005, there is a strong effect on job-exits from shareholder returns. 
Furthermore, they conducted a news search of reasons for exit to identify exits due to 
dismissal.  Unsurprisingly,  the  effect  of  poor  shareholder  returns  is  observed  most 
strongly for those CEOs who are forced to leave. In contrast, exit for retirement is 
most common after good returns. 
                                                 
16 The problem is that a firm may, for example, be in the TW data in 2001 and 2003 but not 2002. If the 
executive is in the 2001 survey but not the 2003 survey we cannot date the final pay year since we do 
not know whether he was still with the firm in 2002. The Boardex data does not have this attrition 
problem as we observe every consecutive year. 19 
 
 
IV.D Institutional Ownership 
There is an extensive literature on the impact of external shareholder control on both 
executive pay and firm performance. Numerous studies have argued that pay in the 
boardroom is related to measures of corporate governance such as the proportion of 
independent directors, the existence of a remuneration committee etc. Focusing on 
economic  outcomes,  Aghion,  Van  Reenen  and  Zingales  (2009)  find  that  higher 
institutional ownership in U.S. companies is associated with more innovation. Their 
suggested mechanism  is  that institutional investors  reduce the career risk  of risky 
projects.  
 
Our data on institutional ownership comes from Thomson Reuters Global Ownership 
files. We are able to match all but 14 companies in the Boardex data. The data we use 
relates to December of each year from 1997 and records the percentage of outstanding 
shares  owned  by  all  those  with  a  shareholding  larger  than  0.015%.  For  each 
shareholder,  the  data  records  the  type  of  investor  (e.g.  individual,  investment 
manager, hedge fund etc.), the geographic location of the investor and whether the 
investor is active or passive. In what follows, we simply calculate for each year the 
percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional investors. Across the sample as 
a whole, institutional investors account for 60% of share ownership – roughly the 
same as observed for the U.S. in the 2000s (Aghion et al, 2009). There is significant 
variation across companies, with a standard deviation of 19 percentage points. We 
split the sample into quartiles based on average institutional ownership and focus on 




First, we examine whether the estimated pay -performance link differs depending on 
institutional ownership. Column (1) of Table 8  repeats the basic CEO fixed -effect 
TSR regression from Table 2 for the slightly reduced sample for which we also have 
institutional ownership data. The estimated coefficient is 0.243, which is reassuringly 
                                                 
17 Nothing hangs on using quartiles or combining the highest three quartiles into one category. Results 
available on request show that the remaining three quartiles have very similar estimated coefficients 
and one cannot reject equality. When comparing the lowest quartile with the other category, there is no 
evidence of significant differences across observables such as sales, employment, market capitalisation 
or executive pay levels or growth rates. 20 
 
similar  to  that  reported  earlier.  In  the  second  column,  we  include  an  additional 
interaction between TSR and a dummy for the lowest quartile of ownership.
18 This is 
significantly negative and we cannot reject at the 5% level that the overall pay -
performance elasticity for low ownership firms is equal to zero. The pay-performance 
elasticity for the remaining three-quarters of firms rises to 0.325. So, firms with lower 
levels of institutional ownership do not seem to link pay and performance for their 
CEO. 
 
In the remaining three columns of the Table we investigate whether the asymmetry we 
observed  earlier  is  related  to  institutional  ownership.  We  again  estimate  first -
difference regressions allowing for a different pay -performance elasticity between 
positive and negative shareholder returns. Column (4) reproduces the results of Table 
4 showing that there appears to be a marginal propensity to reward positive returns 
more favourably than negative returns are penalised.  However when we allow for 
interactions  with  low  institutional  owne rship,  the  differences  are  stark.  Low 
ownership firms strongly reward positive returns with higher pay but require no pay 
penalty for negative returns. In contrast, the higher ownership firms appear to reward 
performance perfectly symmetrically. 
 
IV.E Instrumental Variable estimates  
The  endogeneity  of  shareholder  returns  is  rarely  discussed  in  the  CEO  pay-
performance  literature.  This  is  somewhat  surprising  since  it  seems  reasonable  to 
suppose that shocks to CEO pay can lead to contemporaneous changes in shareholder 
returns  that  would  bias  downward  the  rent-sharing  parameter.  Similarly,  Abowd 
(1989) finds effects of shocks to bargained labour costs on the common stock value of 
firms.    The  problems  of  endogeneity  have  a  longer  history  in  the  rent-sharing 
literature. In addition to exploiting the lag structure of  the panels that Blanchflower et 
al  (1996)  focused  on,    potential  external  instruments  have  included  firm-specific 
technological innovation  (Van Reenen , 1996), import/export price shocks (Abowd 
and  Lemieux  ,  1993,  and  Bertrand,  2004)  and  oil  price  shocks  (Bertrand  and 
Mullainathan, 2001). More recently, Card et al (2010) instruments the value-added 
per worker of each firm (their measure of rents) by the value-added per worker of all 
                                                 
18 All regressions with institutional ownership effects also include a full-set of interactions between the 
ownership dummy and the time dummies and total employment. 21 
 
firms in the same four-digit industry outside the region of Italy on which their analysis 
is conducted. The identifying assumption is that industry demand shocks affect firm-
level profitability but have no direct effect on local labour supply
19.  
 
We consider  instrumenting  firm-level shareholder returns with the returns in the 
global industry, but dropping the UK firms from this index to avoid a mechanical 
relationship (the Datastream Industrial Sub-Sector Global-ex-UK Index). For our 439 
firms we have 93 such sub-sectors.  For the quasi-rents measure we follow Card et al 
(2010) using and  instrument firm-level quasi-rents by quasi-rents at the  three-digit 
industry level in all other listed firms in the UK
20.  
 
In Table 9A we begin by reporting the IV estimates for the shareholder return results. 
We repeat the OLS results from Table 2 in the first column, while the second column 
reports the IV results. The first -stage F-Statistics are reported in the third  column 
(these are  generally large suggesting that the instrument has power ). In almost all 
cases the IV estimates are close to the OLS  estimates and remain significantly 
positive. The only exception is for workers, where the IV estimate is lower than the 
OLS and insignificantly different from zero. At face value, the IV results  imply that 
workers receive no benefit whatsoever from higher shareholder returns, while senior 
management continue to reap substantial rewards for performance. 
 
Turning  to  t he  quasi-rent  results  in  Table  9 B,  we  note  immediately  that  the 
instruments have generally less power than those for shareholder returns, particularly 
in the ASHE data. However, as with the TSR results, we again find sizeable rent -
sharing elasticities for senior executives – with elasticities in the range of 0.3 to 0.5, 
though measured with considerable uncertainty. For junior managers we find larger 
                                                 
19 Manning (2011) points out that what we are striving to identify is the effect of a change in rents in a 
single firm on wages in that firm. Using industry-level instruments may not identify this effect. If 
human capital has an industry-specific component, then a positive shock to industry profits would be 
expected to raise the demand for labour in a competitive market and hence raise the general level of 
wages. In an ideal world we would use firm-specific shocks to profits that are uncorrelated with firm-
specific wages. 
20 We also experimented with using information on the energy-share of costs at the 3 and 4-digit level 
combined with energy price moves over the sample period. In no specification was such an instrument 
strong enough to provide convincing identification. In addition we considered instruments based on 
export/import shares interacted with  movements in the effective exchange rate. Unfortunately over 
most of our sample period, sterling was quite stable against the currencies of major trading partners. 22 
 
rent-sharing  than  was  the  case  for  shareholder  returns.  Finally,  for  workers  the 
elasticity is estimated to be only around 0.025
21.  
 
We also report IV estimates of the rent -sharing parameter for the full sample of all 
workers in Table A2. The advantage of exploiting the full sample is that we have 
many more workers across many companies which help to identify a more powerful 
first-stage regression. The  results clearly suggest that the OLS esti mates are biased 
downwards and for the overall sample the elas ticity rises from 0.007 to 0.032 . 
Interestingly this increase is almost identical to that reported by Card et al when 
moving from OLS to IV (their estimated elasticity rises from 0.008 to 0.029). It is also 
very close to the estimated worker elasticity in our Boardex /ASHE sub-sample of 
workers.  
 
With the important caveat that we have no natural experiment to generate external 
instruments, the qualitative findings from Table 9A and 9B support our earlier overall 
conclusion  from OLS. In all the exercises we have conducted, the elasticity of 
worker’s pay with respect to either shareholder returns or quasi-rents is small and 
often insignificantly different from zero. In contrast, senior executives see substantial 
elasticities that are robust to alternative estimation strategies and, if anything, tend to 
be larger in IV estimates. Non-executive managers lay in between these extremes, 
with pay elasticities perhaps around one-fifth of the size of CEO elasticities. 
 
IV.F The CEO-Worker Pay Gap over the Decade 
 
Our results talk to the pay-performance link across firms and workers, but do not 
directly  address  the  issue  of  relative  pay  growth  over  time.  By  construction,  our 
empirical work abstracts from aggregate trends in pay growth across different workers 
by  including  time  dummies  in  all  specifications.  But  as  we  highlighted  in  the 
introduction, there has been a tremendous out-performance of CEO pay relative to 
workers over the course of the last decade. Average CEO pay across our full sample 
                                                 
21 Note that the first stage F-statistic is weak for this specification (2.7). This is surprising as it is the 
same instrument that gives an F-statistics of 12-15 in the Boardex data. The reason is that we have 
many employees in firms where the instrument is not strong. If we keep only one worker from each 
firm/year that we match the F is 10. 23 
 
rose from £911,000 to £1.92m.
22 Over the same period, the average wage of a fu ll-
time worker rose from £23,925 to £32,178. In other words, CEOs witnessed a 110% 
increase in their pay, while workers received only 35% more. So the ratio of CEO to 
worker pay rose from 38 to 60. But what of shareholder returns? The total return on 
the FTSE350 over the same period was 46.1 % - mainly driven by dividends. If we 
assume  that  performance  is  measured  as  the  real  return  and  using  a  0.3  pay-
performance elasticity for CEOs (from the IV estimates), this would imply an average 
increase in relative pay over the period of 7.4% as a result of performance. So, we can 
account for only around one-tenth of the relative gain of CEO pay over the period as a 
result of shareholder return performance. 
 
So what can account for the growth in CEO pay? We would make the following 
simple point. Wage inequality over the last de cade has been driven by substantial 
gains in pay for those at the very extreme of the wage distribution (see Bell and Van 
Reenen, 2010). Whilst CEOs and other senior executives of publicly-listed companies 
are members of this extreme, they are not a substantial component. Suppose we focus 
on the top 1% of earners. I n 2010, tax data show that  the total earned income of 
taxpayers in the economy was £776bn
23. The same tax data show that the top 1% of 
earners take around 13% of this total i.e. £101bn. In our data, the average CEO in 
2010 received total pay of £1.92m. Thus for the top 300 firms who between them 
account for 94% of the total UK stock market, we get a total CEO pay bill of around  
£0.6bn. So even if we make generous assumptions regarding the pay of  all the other 
senior executives on the Board of these firms, it is hard to see how we could surpass a 
total of more than £3bn
24. So corporate executives perhaps account for around 3% of 
the top 1% of earners
25. As we show in Bell and Van Reenen (2010), over  40% of 
                                                 
22 The median increase for the CEO sample was from £617,000 to £1.32m 
23 This figure is derived from HMRC statistics. They report an estimated total income of all taxpayers 
in the UK for 2010 of £857bn. Using 2008 data, we know that 90.6% of total income is income from 
employment (or pensions deriving from previous employment) while the remained is investment 
income. Applying this percentage split to the 2010 data gives the figure of £776bn. 
24 In 2010, our data show that Level 2 executives received average total pay of £1.10m. If we assume 
that there are five non-CEO executive directors for each of the 300 companies, this adds an additional 
£1.65bn to the wage bill. 
25 Of course almost all the CEOs and a fraction of other senior executives are actually in the top 0.1% 
of the distribution. This group take around 5% of the total income share i.e. £39bn. But even amongst 
this group, corporate executives are still clearly a small minority. 24 
 
workers in the top percentile are in the financial sector
26, while lawyers, accountants 
and management consultants are also all important contributors. This accounting point 
has been made for the U .S. by Kaplan and Rauh (2010).  They calculate that non-
financial corporate executives can account for no more than 4% of the top 0.1% of 
earners in the United States. 
 
Trends in CEO pay over the last decade closely match trends in the pay of other 
highly-paid workers. In Figure 1, we plot the growth in CEO p ay (obtained as the 
change in the estimated time dummies from the fixed -effect regressions in Table 2), 
together with the growth in pay of the top 1% and top 0.1% of workers from ASHE 
(having excluded all senior corporate executives from the data set). Whi le the ASHE 
data is noisy for the top 0.1%, the similarity in trends is very clear. Indeed between 
1999 and 2010, we estimate that overall CEO pay growth was essentially identical  to 
that of non-executives in the top 0.1% of workers. So CEOs are a small fraction of the 
top earners in the UK and the trend in CEO pay has been the same as the trend in non-
executive pay among top earners. Explanations for CEO pay growth are thus likely to 
be found in a more general account of pay  evolutions  at the top  of the income 
distribution. 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
At the beginning of this paper we asked whether there was any advantage in working 
for  a  successful,  profitable  company.  We  are  now  in  a  position  to  answer  that 
question. All the evidence we have examined suggests that senior executives reap the 
rewards of success  while more junior managers and workers have wages  that are 
much more weakly correlated with firm success. It matters not whether we measure 
this success by shareholder returns or quasi-rents – the results are consistent across the 
measures of firm performance. 
 
                                                 
26 Another way of noting the relative importance of finance workers and corporate executives in the 
extreme of the income distribution is to examine the pay report of Barclays Bank for 2010. As part of 
enhanced disclosure requirements in the UK, Barclays revealed that their 231 most senior staff received 
total remuneration of £554m. This is the about the same total as we estimate for all the CEOs in our 
sample. 25 
 
Looking at the separate components of pay allows us to understand the mechanism 
through which improved performance generates higher pay. Base salary tends to be 
unresponsive  to  firm  performance,  while  cash  bonuses  are  very  responsive. 
Interestingly the bonus elasticity with respect to performance is strongly positive for 
all workers, though again larger in magnitude for the more senior members of the 
hierarchy. So workers do see the fruits of success in their bonus payments. But this 
effect is not large enough to feed through to a significant effect on total pay since the 
bonus share of pay is only 5%.  
 
We also show that the responsiveness of pay to performance for senior executives 
depends in part on the level of institutional ownership in the firm. Those firms that 
have  low  institutional  ownership  do  not  have  a  significant  link  between  pay  and 
performance on average. However they appear to reward positive firm performance 
with wage rises while not penalising poor performance. In contrast, firms with higher 
levels of institutional ownership have a substantial stronger pay-performance link that 
appears perfectly symmetric. These findings  complement a range of evidence that 
suggests that external shareholder control matters, at least where it is absent or low. 
 
Why are senior executives treated differently than workers? This is an open question 
that our data cannot directly address. Two competing explanations are extant. First, 
senior executive’s actions have substantial effects on the performance of their firm 
and shareholders wish to incentivize executives to take the right actions (e.g. Gabaix 
and Landier, 2008). Linking pay to performance helps achieve this objective and this 
is what we observe in the data. A second explanation is that executives exploit their 
managerial power to capture the rents that exist (e.g. Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).  
 
Why do workers not enjoy the same rewards? It may be that this is the optimal result 
of an implicit insurance contract between workers and firms, with firms protecting 
workers from idiosyncratic shocks to the firm (see Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi 
(2005)). After all, performance can go down as well as up. Alternatively, it may be 
that an increasingly weakened workforce finds it harder to successfully bargain over 
rents. This latter explanation would be consistent with a declining value of the pay-
performance elasticity over time. 
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The sample of firms is constructed by ranking all UK-domiciled and UK primary-
listed companies by market capitalisation at end-December every year from 2000 to 
2009. We exclude investment trusts. The top 300 firms are selected and over the 
whole period this produces a sample of 498 firms. On average, the top 300 firms each 
year represent 94% of total market capitalization. These firms are then matched to 
share-price and annual accounts data in Datastream. We are able to match 486 of the 
firms. 
 
The Boardex Sample 
The 486 firms with share-price and accounts data are then matched to executive-level 
compensation data from Boardex. We have a flat-file from Boardex containing all 
executives of UK companies over the period 1999-2010. We are able to match all 486 
firms, but only 439 have pay data in Boardex. Of the 47 companies with no pay data, 
23 were delisted by the end of 2003. The Boardex coverage increased substantially at 
around  this  time  and  has  subsequently  covered  almost  all  listed  UK  companies. 
Across all matched companies, we have 3,242 executives with at least two years of 
pay data. 
 
The TW Sample 
The Towers-Watson (TW) sample comes from the annual Executive Compensation 
Survey conducted by TW. The data cover up to five “layers” of management. Level 1 
are CEOs and Executive Chairmen.  Level  2 are all executives  who have a direct 
reporting line to a Level 1 executive. Level 3 executives report directly to Level 2 
executives and so on down the hierarchy. The pay data is substantially more detailed 
than normally provided. All the TW firms used are also in the larger Boardex sample. 
 
To create a panel of executives we need to link job holders over cross-sections. The 
Survey asks for the initials of the job holder each year but these are not provided to us 
for confidentiality reasons. Instead a random number generator was used to create a 
10-digit number that is unique for any set of worker initials. We match over adjacent 
cross-sections using this identifier, company name, year of hire and base salary (each 
survey asks for the prior year base salary of the individual as well as current base 
salary). In this way we create a panel of senior managers over time within a firm, 
allowing for promotions/demotions. However we cannot identify any workers who 
move from one firm to another in this sample. 
 
The ASHE Sample 
For each company in the Boardex sample, we have matched a DUNS number. The 
DUNS number is issued by Dun and Bradstreet and there can be multiple DUNS 
numbers within a single listed company. We use the number that matches the legally-
listed entity. The ONS Annual Respondent Database (ARD) links DUNS numbers 
(called egrp_ref by ONS) to individual firms within the company (identified by the 
employer  reference  variable  entref).  There  can  be  multiple  entref’s  for  a  given 




From 2002 onward, the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings contains an enterprise 
reference number (“entref”) for every worker. Thus we are able to link these to the 
associated DUNS number via the ARD. Of the 401 companies that have a Boardex-
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
                                     
                                               Total Compensation  Salary                      Bonus  LTIP  
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Towers Watson (TW) Sample 
 
CEO (n=624)  2,048  698  639  712 
 
Level 2 (n=3,700)  668  282  189  197 
 




CEO (n=4,295)  1,256  420  302  480 
 
Level 2 (n=10,496)  702  253  177  237 
 
ASHE Matched Sample 
 
Managers (n=21,193)  50  42  7     
 




Notes: All figures are in nominal £ thousands. Data are for 2001-2010 (TW), 2001-2010 (Boardex) and 2002-2009 
(ASHE). LTIP=Long-Term Incentive Plans 33 
 
 
TABLE 2: REMUNERATION AND TOTAL SHAREHOLDER RETURNS (TSR)  
 
                                     




Towers Watson Sample 
 
CEO      0.248**      0.295**     593  163  124 
  (0.055)  (0.061) 
 
Level 2      0.173**       0.151**  3013  918  130   
  (0.042)  (0.040) 
 
Level 3+      0.121**      0.116**  6551  2193  124     
  (0.026)  (0.033) 
   
Boardex Sample 
 
CEO      0.222**      0.152**  4277  897  428 
  (0.030)  (0.031) 
   
Level 2      0.208**      0.138**  10464  2338  433 




Managers      0.023**      0.050**  20445  5108  299 
  (0.006)  (0.008) 
 
Workers      0.011**      0.019**  94650  23738  327 




Notes: ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively.  Each row reports the results from a 
separate regression where the dependent variable is the ln(Total Expected Remuneration) of different types of 
employees  from  each  of  our  three  pay  datasets  (Towers  Watson,  Boardex  and  ASHE).  In  all  specifications 
ln(TSR=Total Shareholder Return) is the measure of firm performance used and we report the OLS coefficient and 
standard error clustered by firm in parentheses underneath. The first column is the “impact” effect which includes 
only  contemporaneously  dated  ln(TSR).  Column  2  reports  the  long-run  effect  from  a  regression  with  both 
contemporaneous  and  two  lags  of  ln(TSR).  All  regressions  include  worker-firm  match  fixed-effects,  log 
employment and time dummies. ASHE worker regressions include two-digit industry ln(wages) and two digit 





















TABLE 3: REMUNERATION AND QUASI-RENTS PER EMPLOYEE 
 
                                     




Towers Watson Sample 
 
 
CEO      0.235**      0.374**  558  154  120 
  (0.104)  (0.129)   
 
Level 2      0.168**     0.219*  2796  869  124 
  (0.085)   (0.129) 
 
Level 3+  0.028  0.037  6137  2088  118 
  (0.037)   (0.073) 




CEO      0.203**      0.189**  4284  900  430 
  (0.038)   (0.047) 
   
Level 2      0.240**      0.231**  10476  2342  435 




Managers      0.037**    0.047*  19455  4860  291 
  (0.018)   (0.026) 
 
Workers  0.019  0.021  88132  22153  318 




Notes: ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively. Each row reports the results from a 
separate regression where the dependent variable is the ln(Total Expected Remuneration) of different types of 
employees  from  each  of  our  three  pay  datasets  (Towers  Watson,  Boardex  and  ASHE).  In  all  specifications 
ln(QRN=Quasi-Rents per worker) is the measure of firm performance used and we report the OLS coefficient and 
standard error clustered by firm in parentheses underneath. The first column is the “impact” effect which includes 
only  contemporaneously  dated  ln(QRN).  Column  2  reports  the  long-run  effect  from  a  regression  with  both 
contemporaneous  and  two  lags  of  ln(QRN).  All  regressions  include  worker-firm  match  fixed-effects,  log 
employment and time dummies. ASHE worker regressions include two-digit industry ln(wages) and two digit 
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TABLE 4: ASYMMETRIES IN PAY-PERFORMANCE ELASTICITIES  
 
                                     




Towers Watson Sample 
 
CEO      0.199**  -0.045     428  163  124 
  (0.053)  (0.103) 
 
Level 2      0.158**  0.058  2048  918  129   
  (0.047)  (0.082) 
 
Level 3+      0.093**  -0.004  4239  2193  123     
  (0.029)  (0.064) 
   
Boardex Sample 
 
CEO      0.233**    0.132*  3356  870  424 
  (0.043)  (0.073) 
   
Level 2      0.175**      0.263**  8085  2270  431 




Managers      0.041**  -0.031  14786  5108  295 
  (0.016)  (0.028) 
 
Workers      0.016**  -0.007  66069  23738  325 




Notes: ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively.  Each row reports the results from a 
separate  first-difference  regression  where  the  dependent  variable is  the  Δln(Total  Expected  Remuneration)  of 
different types of employees from each of our three pay datasets (Towers Watson, Boardex and ASHE). In all 
specifications Δln(TSR=Total Shareholder Return) is the measure of firm performance used and an asymmetry is 
allowed for by including ΔlnTSR when positive as an additional regressor. We report the OLS coefficients and 
standard error clustered by firm in parentheses underneath. All regressions include the change in log employment 
and  time  dummies.  ASHE  worker  regressions  include  two-digit  industry  ln(wages)  and  two  digit  occupation 









TABLE 5: DECOMPOSING THE EFFECT OF TOTAL SHAREHOLDER RETURN ON BASE 
SALARY, BONUS AND LTIP 
 
 




Towers Watson Sample 
 
CEO  0.026*  3.786**  0.682** 
  (0.014)  (0.720)  (0.336) 
 
Level 2  0.019  2.287**  0.991** 
  (0.014)  (0.751)  (0.343) 
 
Level 3+  0.010  1.497**  0.744* 




CEO  0.010  1.036**  0.489** 
  (0.015)  (0.089)  (0.102) 
 
Level 2  -0.005  0.918**  0.574** 




Managers   -0.012  1.368** 
  (0.014)  (0.620) 
 
Workers  -0.001  0.762** 




Notes: ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively. Each cell reports the results from a 
separate regression where the dependent variable is the ln(Base Salary) in column 1, ln(1+Bonus) in column 2 and 
ln(1+LTIP) in column 3 where LTIP is the estimated value of the Long-Term Incentive Pay plan. Each row is 
based on different types of employees from each of our three pay datasets (Towers Watson, Boardex and ASHE). 
In all specifications ln(TSR=Total Shareholder Return) is the measure of firm performance used and we report the 
OLS coefficient and standard error clustered by firm in parentheses underneath. All regressions include worker-
firm match fixed-effects, log employment and time dummies. ASHE worker regressions include two-digit industry 








TABLE 6: DECOMPOSING THE EFFECT OF QUASI-RENTS ON BASE  








Towers Watson Sample 
 
CEO  0.117**  1.082  0.800 
  (0.036)  (1.099)  (0.990) 
 
Level 2  0.047  0.508  0.329 
  (0.042)  (0.779)  (0.607) 
 
Level 3  0.020  0.287  -0.070 





CEO  0.097**  0.738**  0.194 
  (0.024)  (0.165)  (0.183) 
 
Level 2  0.111**  0.702**  0.538** 





Managers  0.009  2.027** 
  (0.022)  (1.011) 
 
Workers  -0.004  1.707** 




Notes: ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively. Each cell reports the results from a 
separate regression where the dependent variable is the ln(Base Salary) in column 1, ln(1+Bonus) in column 2 and 
ln(1+LTIP) in column 3 where LTIP is the estimated value of the Long-Term Incentive Pay plan. Each row is 
based on different types of employees from each of our three pay datasets (Towers Watson, Boardex and ASHE). 
In all specifications ln(QRN=Quasi-Rents per worker) is the measure of firm performance used and we report the 
OLS coefficient and standard error clustered by firm in parentheses underneath. All regressions include worker-
firm match fixed-effects, log employment and time dummies. ASHE worker regressions include two-digit industry 
ln(wages) and two digit occupation ln(wages) controls. 
 
 





TABLE 7: JOB-EXIT MARGINAL PROBABILITIES  
 
 





∆lnTSR  -0.071**  -0.052**  -0.029 




# obs       3155       9307        164725 
 
# firms       419       420         372 
 




Notes: ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively. The coefficients are marginal effects 








TABLE 8: INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP EFFECTS FOR CEOS 
 
                                     




lnTSR     0.243**      0.325** 
  (0.028)  (0.027) 
 
lnTSR * Low II       -0.244** 
    (0.055) 
 
       
ΔlnTSR          0.308**      0.251**     0.343**   
      (0.033)  (0.041)  (0.037) 
 
ΔlnTSR(+)                                 0.140*              0.046 
        (0.073)  (0.084) 
 
ΔlnTSR * Low II            -0.282**   
          (0.080) 
  
ΔlnTSR(+) * Low II                                                          0.279** 




FE/FD  FE  FE  FD  FD  FD 
 
# obs  4251  4251  3338  3338  3338 
 
# firms  426  426  423  423  423 




Notes: ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively.  The first two columns are fixed-effect 
models with the log of total expected pay as the dependent variable. The final three columns report first-difference 
models allowing for a differential pay-performance elasticity between negative and positive return realisations. 
Low II firms are those with average institutional investor share ownership in the lowest quartile across all sample 
firms. All regressions include log employment and time dummies, fully interacted with the Low II dummy in 
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TABLE 9A: IV ESTIMATES OF SHAREHOLDER RETURN EFFECTS ON PAY 
 
 
                   OLS              IV                 First-Stage             Sample 




Towers Watson Sample 
 
CEO  0.248**  0.324**  7.9  593 
  (0.055)  (0.145)   
 
Level 2  0.173**  0.212**  14.0  3013 
  (0.042)  (0.107) 
 
Level 3+  0.121**  0.103  25.3  6551 




CEO  0.222**  0.320**  136.7  4277 
  (0.030)  (0.073) 
 
Level 2  0.208**  0.341**  135.6  10464 




Managers  0.023**  0.046**  14.4  20445 
  (0.006)  (0.022) 
   
Workers  0.011**  0.004  19.3  94650 




Notes: ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively. The OLS estimates correspond with 
those reported in Table 2. The IV estimates use ICB sub-sector ex-UK shareholder returns as an instrument for 
lnTSR. All regressions include worker-firm match fixed-effects with time dummies and log of employment, and 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
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TABLE 9B: IV ESTIMATES OF QUASI-RENT EFFECTS – USING 3-DIGIT INDUSTRY QRN 
 
 
                   OLS              IV                 First-Stage             Sample 




Towers Watson Sample 
 
CEO  0.226*  0.532*  17.9  519 
  (0.115)  (0.279)   
 
Level 2  0.157*  0.553**  24.9  2664 
  (0.085)  (0.272)   
 
Level 3+  0.021  -0.208  16.6  5792 




CEO  0.200**  0.616**  10.4  4052 
  (0.039)  (0.271) 
 
Level 2  0.239**  0.382*  8.6  9834 




Managers  0.038**  0.151  4.0  18889 
  (0.018)  (0.104) 
 
Workers  0.017  0.025  2.7                85713 




Notes: ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively. The IV estimates use quasi-rents for all 
UK-listed firms in the same 3-digit SIC industry (excluding the firm itself) for lnQRN. We exclude observations in 
which the firm accounts for more than 95% of industry sales. All regressions include worker-firm match fixed-





TABLE A1: RENT-SHARING IN US MANUFACTURING,1964-2005 
 
 
(1)                             (2)                          (3)                                      (4)                                       (5)                                         (6)   
 




         -0.0108  -0.0097  0.0005  -0.0016*  -0.0036**  0.0009 
  (0.0120)  (0.0082)  (0.0130)  (0.0010)  (0.0018)  (0.0014) 
 
(   ) ⁄
     -0.0015  0.0004  0.0004  0.0014**  0.0023**  0.0011** 
  (0.0022)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0004)  (0.0009)  (0.0005) 
 
(   ) ⁄
     0.0031  0.0012*  0.0004  -0.0006  0.0004  -0.0009* 
  (0.0025)  (0.0007)  (0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0010)  (0.0005) 
 
(   ) ⁄
     0.0026  0.0013**  -0.0002  0.0004  0.0022**  -0.0002 
  (0.0021)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0004)  (0.0007)  (0.0004) 
 
          0.3979**  0.2845**  0.2117**  0.8102**  0.7602**  0.6584** 
  (0.0618)  (0.0471)  (0.0529)  (0.0110)  (0.0159)  (0.0147) 
 
 
Long Run Elasticity    0.068  0.039  0.009  0.022  0.054  0.000 
p∑ (   ) ⁄ =0    0.031  0.633  0.039  0.000  0.944 
 
Personal Controls            Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
    0.9960  0.9962  0.9794  0.9953  0.9934  0.9795   
N                                   295                                     348                            320                                   19201                                   10098                                   9103 
 
 
     Personal control variables in columns 1-3 are experience, years of schooling, marital status dummies, race dummies, private sector dummy, percent female. All unemployment rates U and 
the dependent variable w (hourly earnings) are in natural logarithms. Profit-per-employee,     ⁄ , is in levels. All variables, including the dependent variable, are measured as the mean of the 
observation in a year/industry cell. All regressions include year dummies. Standard errors, clustered by industry, are in parentheses. 




TABLE A2: RENT-SHARING ACROSS THE ENTIRE WORKFORCE 
 
 
                   OLS              IV                 First-Stage             Sample 




ASHE Complete Sample 
 
 
All Workers  0.007**  0.032*  15.8  498682 
  (0.001)  (0.017)   
 
Non-Managerial  0.005**  0.039**  12.8  419037 
  (0.001)  (0.019)   
 
Managerial  0.015**  0.019  23.5  74697 
  (0.004)  (0.026) 
 
Firms <= 50 workers  0.045**  0.109**  49.8  91453 
  (0.003)  (0.044) 
 
Firms > 50 workers  0.002  0.024  15.5  403529 
  (0.001)  (0.016) 
 
Firms > 500 workers  0.001  0.026*  16.2  316057 
  (0.002)  (0.015) 
 
Firms > 5000 workers  -0.001  0.027  14.7  195210 
  (0.004)  (0.021) 
 
Manufacturing Firms  0.017**  0.114  1.8  88251 
  (0.004)  (0.096) 
 
Non-Manufacturing Firms  0.006**  0.036*  11.4  404271 
  (0.001)  (0.020) 
 
 
ASHE Boardex Sample 
 
 
Using Global Accounts QRN  0.009  -0.011  2.3                78859 
  (0.012)  (0.086) 
 
Using UK ARD QRN  0.006  -0.031  1.3                78859 
  (0.003)  (0.049) 
 
 
Notes: The results in this table are for all workers in ASHE that can be matched to an enterprise group in the ARD. 
They include workers in both publicly-quoted and private companies. The IV estimates use quasi-rents for all 
firms in the same 4-digit SIC industry (excluding the firm itself) for lnQRN. We exclude observations in which the 
firm accounts for more than 95% of industry sales All regressions include worker-firm match fixed-effects, time 
dummies and lnEmp, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. The sample period is 2002-2008. 
** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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TABLE A3: COMPONENTS OF TOTAL SHAREHOLDER RETURN EFFECTS – IN SHARES 
 
 




Towers Watson Sample 
 
CEO  -0.102**  0.116**  -0.014 
  (0.023)  (0.029)  (0.019) 
 
Level 2  -0.085**  0.062**  0.023* 
  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.014) 
 
Level 3+  -0.071**  0.047**  0.024 




CEO  -0.094**  0.052**  0.042** 
  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.009) 
 
Level 2  -0.095**  0.051**  0.044** 




Managers  -0.030**  0.030** 
  (0.013)  (0.013) 
 
Workers  -0.010*  0.010* 




Notes: The total pay-performance elasticity is decomposed into base salary, cash bonus and incentive plan. The 
dependent variables are the shares of each component in total pay. The ASHE data only records base salary and 
cash bonus. All regressions include worker-firm match fixed effects, log employment and time dummies. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
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TABLE A4: COMPONENTS OF QUASI-RENTS EFFECTS – IN SHARES 
 
 




Towers Watson Sample 
 
CEO  -0.065  0.049  0.016 
  (0.042)  (0.045)  (0.039) 
 
Level 2  -0.056**  0.025  0.031 
  (0.025)  (0.031)  (0.027) 
 
Level 3+  -0.027  0.008  0.019 




CEO  -0.047**  0.050**  -0.003 
  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.015) 
 
Level 2  -0.060**  0.044**  0.017 




Managers  -0.023**  0.023** 
  (0.008)  (0.008) 
 
Workers  -0.020**  0.020** 




Notes: The total pay-performance elasticity is decomposed into base salary, cash bonus and incentive plan. The 
dependent variables are the shares of each component in total pay. The ASHE data only records base salary and 
cash bonus. All regressions include worker-firm match fixed—effects and time dummies. Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level. 
** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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